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Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: 
Some Conflict-of-Laws Questions and Concerns∗ 
Ralph U. Whitten∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American Law Institute’s (ALI) approval of domestic part-
nerships in its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution1 virtually 
assures that some states will recognize such partnerships as part of 
their law of domestic relations. However, unless all states approve 
identical domestic partnership rules, one may also expect frequent 
conflict-of-laws problems to occur as a byproduct of the ALI action. 
The purpose of this article is to describe some of the conflicts issues 
that will arise when parties to domestic partnerships have, or de-
velop, contacts with more than one state. Although a full exposition 
of conflicts issues affecting domestic partnerships must, of necessity, 
await real-world experience, it is possible now to anticipate a number 
of the problems that such partnerships will generate in our federal 
system. The uncertainty for domestic partners created by these con-
flicts problems will be significant. However, the uncertainty can be 
substantially mitigated by private contractual arrangements between 
the parties. 
Generally, conflicts issues concerning domestic partnerships will 
arise in two broad areas: (1) judgment enforcement (and its com-
plementary area of personal jurisdiction) and (2) choice of law. 
Judgment enforcement issues will arise when a state judgment em-
bodies rights derived from a domestic partnership relationship and 
the judgment creditor attempts to enforce the judgment in another 
state that does not recognize domestic partnerships. When this oc-
curs, the judgment debtor may try to resist enforcement of the 
 
 ∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law, Creighton University. 
 1. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) §§ 6.01–6.06 [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)]. 
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judgment on the grounds that the law of the judgment-enforcing 
state is not compatible with that of the judgment-rendering state. 
Such issues will also arise when a plaintiff attempts to enforce rights 
arising out of a domestic partnership against a defendant in another 
state through the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by a court of the 
state in which the plaintiff resides. In some, but not all, of the latter 
cases, the attempted exercise of long-arm jurisdiction will encounter 
constitutional problems. When constitutional problems with long-
arm jurisdiction exist, they will generate corresponding judgment-
enforcement issues in other states. 
Part II will discuss some common situations in which judgment-
enforcement and jurisdictional issues concerning domestic partner-
ships may be expected to arise. As explained there, with the excep-
tion of judgments embodying rights derived from same-sex domestic 
partnerships,2 the states will, with few exceptions, be bound by the 
general implementing statute3 to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
the United States Constitution4 to enforce jurisdictionally valid 
judgments of other states derived from domestic partnerships. Under 
existing United States Supreme Court authorities, it will not be pos-
sible, in cases of domestic partnerships between persons of the oppo-
site sex, for a judgment creditor to resist the enforcement of a valid 
judgment of another state on the grounds that it violates the public 
policy of the judgment-enforcing state. In cases involving judgments 
based on same-sex relationships, however, the outcome of enforce-
ment proceedings in another state is less clear because of a special 
implementing statute (the Defense of Marriage Act) enacted by 
Congress that may extend to same-sex domestic partnerships.5 
Conflicts issues other than those concerning judgment-
enforcement or jurisdiction will occur in cases where persons in a 
domestic partnership relationship move from state to state. In this 
situation, one of the partners may ask a state court to recognize the 
existence of the domestic partnership under the state’s own law or 
the law of another state. The other partner, in turn, may resist rec-
 
 2. The American Law Institute’s proposal defines domestic partners as “two persons of 
the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time 
share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), 
supra note 1, § 6.01(1). 
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 5. See The Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1994). 
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ognition of the partnership on the ground that the forum should ap-
ply the law of a state that does not recognize domestic partnerships. 
These issues may arise in two situations. First, a conflicts issue may 
arise when one of the partners brings a proceeding in a state that 
does not recognize domestic partnerships, but the partners have pre-
viously resided in a state that does recognize such partnerships. Sec-
ond, a conflicts question may also arise when the plaintiff brings a 
proceeding in a state that recognizes domestic partnerships, but the 
partners have previously resided, perhaps for the most significant 
portion of their relationship, in a state that does not recognize do-
mestic partnerships. Additional conflicts problems may also arise 
when multiple states with which the parties have had contacts recog-
nize domestic partnerships but regulate the details of such partner-
ships differently. 
Part III will discuss some common situations in which conflicts 
problems may be expected to occur in cases of peripatetic domestic 
partners. In these situations, whether the partners are in a same-sex 
or a different-sex relationship, there is a substantial likelihood that 
the state asked to recognize the partnership can refuse to do so in a 
constitutionally legitimate fashion. Existing United States Supreme 
Court decisions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment6 and the Full Faith and Credit Clause impose only 
minimal restrictions on the power of states to apply their own law 
rather than the law of other states. This means that the states will 
generally be able to decide conflict-of-laws questions concerning 
domestic partnerships under their individual choice-of-law systems 
without fear of federal constitutional restraint. Therefore, the recog-
nition of rights under a domestic partnership will depend heavily on 
the kind of choice-of-law system employed by a state and the way in 
which the state applies the system to the facts of a particular case. 
However, as in the case of judgments, same-sex domestic partners 
may also expect greater problems than different-sex partners in ob-
taining recognition of their partnerships under state choice-of-law 
doctrines. 
Part IV will conclude with some general remarks about the 
avoidance of both judgment-enforcement questions and conflict-of-
laws questions concerning domestic partnerships. The ALI proposals 
recognize the propriety of agreements between domestic partners to 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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settle their affairs in advance.7 Furthermore, American courts, acting 
under diverse conflict-of-laws systems, generally recognize and en-
force contractual agreements between parties governed by the law of 
other states, even when such agreements could not validly have been 
formed under the law of the state where enforcement is sought.8 In 
addition, American courts generally recognize the ability of contract-
ing parties to choose the law that will govern their agreement by a 
valid choice-of-law clause in a contract,9 as well as the ability of con-
tracting parties to limit litigation over their contractual obligations to 
a particular state through a valid choice-of-forum clause. These 
widely recognized principles offer domestic partners the opportunity 
to stabilize their property arrangements through contract rather than 
subjecting their relational obligations to the vagaries of general con-
flicts law in the several states. 
II. ENFORCING JUDGMENTS EMBODYING  
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS 
A. The General Rules of Judgment Enforcement 
The enforcement of state judgments in the United States has 
been controlled since 1790 by the general implementing statute to 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.10 
In 1813, the United States Supreme Court interpreted this statute to 
require that state judgments must be given the same effect in other 
states as those judgments would receive in the courts of the state 
where they were rendered.11 This “same effect” rule essentially re-
 
 7. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01(2); see also id. §§ 
7.01–7.18 (governing agreements between domestic partners and others entering into domes-
tic relationships). 
 8. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971) (stat-
ing that the “most significant relationship” approach to the rules governs a contracts choice-of-
law decision in the absence of an effective choice by the parties). 
 9. See, e.g., id. § 187. 
 10. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 
(1994)). 
 11. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813). Commentators on the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause sometimes state that the Mills decision interpreted the Constitution as 
opposed to the implementing statute. See, e.g., Julie L. B. Johnson, Comment, The Meaning 
of “General Laws”: The Extent of Congress’s Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
and the Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1619 
(1997); Thomas M. Keane, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for 
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quires a reference to the res judicata law of the judgment-rendering 
state in order to determine the proper scope of that state’s judg-
ment.12 Subject to a few well-recognized exceptions, the Court has 
steadily adhered to the “same effect” rule to the present day. The ex-
ceptions include judgments rendered without personal or subject-
matter jurisdiction in the judgment-rendering court,13 judgments 
procured by extrinsic fraud,14 judgments barred by the limitations 
period of the judgment-enforcing state applicable to foreign judg-
ments,15 nonfinal and modifiable judgments of other states,16 and 
 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499, 501 (1995). This is flatly incor-
rect. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Histori-
cal-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 66–67 (1957) (observing that Mills only in-
terpreted the statute); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 379–80 (1998) 
[hereinafter Whitten, Original Understanding and DOMA]. Thus, the “same effect” rule is a 
byproduct of congressional action, not a constitutional rule. 
 12. See LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 172–73 (2d ed. 
2000) [hereinafter TEPLY & WHITTEN] (discussing Mills). See also id. at 949–63 (discussing 
the modern issues involved in the enforcement of state judgments in other state and federal 
courts); LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL III ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 65–75 (5th ed. 
2001) (forthcoming Fall 2001) [hereinafter MCDOUGAL ET AL.] (discussing in detail the his-
torical and modern issues concerning the enforcement of state judgments). 
 13. Lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction ordinarily constitute specific applica-
tions of the “same effect” rule of the general implementing statute rather than true exceptions 
to the rule. This is because normally lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction in the 
judgment-rendering court will render a judgment void in the state that rendered the judgment 
and thus unenforceable there in a separate proceeding. This, in turn, renders the judgment 
unenforceable in another state under the “same effect” rule. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra 
note 12, at 945–48 (discussing the rules pertaining to the res judicata effect of a determination 
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction in detail). See also MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 
12, § 70 (discussing jurisdictional exceptions to the “same effect” rule comprehensively). Lack 
of personal and subject matter jurisdiction are referred to as exceptions to the general rule in 
this article because it has become commonplace to do so in the law and literature of conflicts. 
 14. Extrinsic fraud is actually a specific application of the “same effect” rule rather than 
an exception to it. Extrinsic fraud in the procurement of a judgment normally renders a judg-
ment invalid in the state where it is rendered and thus unenforceable there. This, in turn, 
makes the judgment unenforceable in other states under the “same effect” rule of the general 
implementing statute. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 70 (discussing extrinsic fraud 
as well as other “exceptions” to the “same effect” rule). Fraud is nevertheless referred to as an 
“exception” to the general rule in the text because it has become commonplace to do so in the 
law and literature of conflict of laws. 
 15. The ability to apply a statute of limitations of the judgment-enforcing state to an-
other state’s judgment is a “true” exception to the general “same effect” rule of the imple-
menting statute because there is no question that a judgment to which the forum’s limitations 
period applies is valid and enforceable in the state where it is rendered. See id. § 72 (discussing 
the limitations exception). 
 16. The degree to which a state may refuse to enforce a nonfinal judgment of another 
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other state’s penal judgments.17 Significantly for domestic partner-
ship judgments, however, there is no general “public policy” excep-
tion to the “same effect” rule of the general implementing statute.18 
B. Judgment Issues Involving Different-Sex Domestic Partnerships 
1. Judgments based on personal service within the state 
Judgments embodying rights derived from domestic partnerships 
between persons of different sexes will be controlled by the “same 
effect” rule of the general implementing statute to the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause and the exceptions to that rule. A few examples of the 
kinds of cases that may arise will be useful in illustrating how judg-
ment-enforcement issues may arise in domestic partnership situa-
tions. 
Assume that A and B are persons of different sexes residing in 
State X, which recognizes domestic partnerships under conditions 
identical to the ALI proposals. Under the law of State X, A and B 
qualify as domestic partners. A and B decide to separate, and A sues 
B in a court of State X with proper subject matter jurisdiction to ob-
tain recognition of the partnership and obtain an equitable division 
of the partnership property under the law of State X. B is properly 
served in this action and appears to contest A’s claims. The court 
finds that A and B qualify as domestic partners and enters a judg-
ment making a property award to A. B leaves State X with the bulk 
of the partnership property and relocates in State Y before A can exe-
 
state depends on the law of the judgment-rendering state. If the judgment is sufficiently final 
where rendered to have a res judicata effect, then it must be given such an effect in the state 
where its enforcement is sought. See id. § 70 (discussing this exception). Thus, the “non-final 
judgment” rule is really an example of the application of the “same effect” rule rather than a 
true exception to the rule. It is referred to as an exception in the text because it has become 
customary in the law and literature of conflicts to do so. The status of modifiable judgments is 
more confused, as well as more complex to explain. For a full discussion, see id. (discussing the 
modifiable judgment rule). 
 17. The penal judgment rule is a true exception to the “same effect” rule of the imple-
menting statute, because there is no question that penal judgments of other states are valid and 
enforceable where rendered, even though they may be denied enforcement in other states. See 
id. § 73 (Judgments and Public Acts: State Judgments: Judgments Based on Penal Statutes and 
Governmental Claims) (discussing the penal judgment exception in detail). 
 18. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 239 (1998) (indicating that a state 
may not refuse to enforce another state’s judgment based on the enforcing states’ conflict-of-
laws rules or policy preferences). 
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cute the judgment in State X. A brings an appropriate proceeding in 
a State Y court to enforce the State X judgment. State Y is obligated 
by the implementing statute to the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
give the same effect to the State X judgment that it would receive in 
State X. Normally, this will be a res judicata effect, which will pre-
clude B from contesting A’s claims under the doctrine of claim pre-
clusion and will also preclude B from contesting issues litigated and 
determined against B in the State X action if the issues supported 
and were essential to the judgment.19 The State X court possessed 
personal jurisdiction over B and subject matter jurisdiction over the 
action, and there is no apparent basis on the facts given for State Y to 
apply any nonjurisdictional exception to the “same effect” rule. Even 
if State Y does not recognize domestic partnerships under its own 
law and considers them contrary to its strong public policy, it may 
not refuse to enforce the State X judgment on that ground because 
no general public policy exception exists to the command of the im-
plementing statute.20 
2. Judgments based on long-arm service 
More complicated cases will occur when one of the domestic 
partners abandons the state where the partners have been residing for 
a substantial period and establishes a new domicile in another state. 
If the stay-behind partner commences litigation to obtain an equita-
ble property division or compensation based on the domestic part-
nership, a court in the state where the partners formerly cohabited 
will undoubtedly be able to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the 
defendant partner even though he or she has moved to another state. 
The plaintiff’s claim arises under the forum’s domestic partnership 
 
 19. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 900–38 (discussing the doctrines of claim 
and issue preclusion). 
 20. The only doubt that might exist about the enforceability of the judgment in another 
state is if the judgment is one for periodic support payments and the judgment is modifiable. 
The ALI envisions that such judgments for periodic payments will be proper under its propos-
als. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, February 14, 1997) §§ 5.01(3), 5.05(3) 
& (5), 5.06(4), 5.07, 5.08, 5.09, 5.10(1), 5.11. However, under existing Supreme Court 
precedent, there is doubt about the extent to which judgments modifiable in the state where 
rendered can be refused enforcement in other states. See MCDOUGAL ET AL, supra note 12, § 
70. The better interpretation of the case law is, however, that judgments subject to retroactive 
or future modification should have to be enforced by other states until actually modified by the 
judgment-rendering state or the judgment-enforcing state. See id. 
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law and is based on a relationship with a close connection to the fo-
rum. This will provide an adequate basis for the State constitutionally 
to assert “specific jurisdiction” over the defendant under an appro-
priate long-arm statute.21 Once the state renders a constitutionally 
valid judgment based on the domestic partnership, that judgment 
will be enforceable in every other state under the implementing stat-
ute. 
3. Judgments based on property within the state 
A more difficult case under present law would occur if the peri-
patetic partner were to establish a domicile in a new state, take prop-
erty accumulated during the partnership in the state where the part-
ners formerly cohabited, and commence an action in the new 
domicile to obtain a judgment for the property. For example, assume 
that domestic partners A and B reside in State X, which recognizes 
domestic partnerships. A changes domiciles to State Y, which also 
recognizes domestic partnerships under a law identical to that of 
State X.22 A takes the bulk of the property accumulated during the 
partnership to State Y and there commences a proceeding to obtain 
recognition of the partnership and a judgment awarding the property 
to A. A serves B with long-arm process in this action under the State 
Y long-arm statute, which extends the jurisdiction of the State Y 
courts to any case in which it is not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion of the United States for those courts to exercise personal juris-
diction over nonresidents.23 State Y, however, is a state with which B 
 
 21. A state asserts specific jurisdiction when it asserts jurisdiction based on a claim aris-
ing out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the state. A state asserts general jurisdic-
tion when its assertion of jurisdiction is based on a claim that does not arise out of and is not 
related to the defendant’s contacts with the state. An assertion of specific jurisdiction is valid 
under the Due Process Clause if the defendant has purposeful contacts with the state and the 
assertion of jurisdiction is otherwise reasonable. An assertion of general jurisdiction is valid un-
der the Due Process Clause if the defendant has systematic and continuous contacts with the 
state, but it is not clear if the assertion of jurisdiction must also pass a reasonableness test, as in 
the case of specific jurisdiction. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 202–278 (discussing 
the modern due process restrictions on state-court jurisdiction); see also id. at 222–48 (discuss-
ing the modern due process concepts of “general” and “specific” jurisdiction); MCDOUGAL ET 
AL., supra note 12, §§ 22–24 (discussing the traditional and modern bases for asserting per-
sonal jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause, including the concepts of specific 
and general jurisdiction). 
 22. This assumption is made in order to simplify the conflict-of-laws context of the ad-
judication. The reasons for this will be clear from the later discussion. See infra Part III. 
 23. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 216–20 (discussing modern state long-
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has no contacts, ties, or relations. 
The problem with A’s action is that, under the minimum con-
tacts test of International Shoe v. Washington24 and its progeny,25 
State Y’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over B would appear to 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If 
this is so, State Y could not enter a judgment binding on B. Thus, B 
would be free to litigate any matters relevant to the parties’ relation-
ship, including the existence of the domestic partnership, the proper 
division of the property, and so forth, in State X (or elsewhere), free 
from the usual res judicata effects that would have to be given to a 
jurisdictionally valid judgment under the compulsion of the general 
implementing statute. Nevertheless, the case described is more com-
plicated than this simple analysis suggests. 
If A and B were a married couple, there is no question that State 
Y would have the power to divorce them based on A’s domicile 
alone.26 However, under the concept of “divisible divorce” prevailing 
in the United States today, State Y would not have the power to en-
ter a personal judgment against B, such as a judgment for alimony, 
assuming that B does not have minimum contacts with State Y.27 
Domestic partnerships, however, are not completely analogous to 
marriages. As conceptualized by the ALI proposals, domestic part-
 
arm statutes); MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 27 (same). 
 24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 25. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 202–86 (discussing the development and 
application of the minimum contacts test); MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, §§ 20–24 (dis-
cussing International Shoe and its progeny). 
 26. This curious result is the byproduct of the rule of the Williams decisions. See Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S 226 (1945) (Williams II); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 
U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams I). In these cases, the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
power of states to divorce based on the domicile of the plaintiff alone, even though the defen-
dant has never been anywhere near the state. The theory was that the marital status of the 
plaintiff was a “thing,” or res, that followed the plaintiff to the new domicile. The presence of 
the thing in the state was like the presence of property, which allowed the state to exercise 
power over it. With the advent of the minimum contacts test of International Shoe, it might 
have been reasoned that this theory was no longer sound. However, in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977), the Supreme Court went out of its way to preserve the ex parte 
divorce jurisdiction from invalidation under the minimum contacts test, though it did so cryp-
tically. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 205–07 (discussing the impact of Shaffer on 
ex parte divorce); MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, §§ 204, 207 (discussing, inter alia, mar-
riage as a status and divorce jurisdiction based on the in rem theory). 
 27. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 
541 (1948); TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 207–08 (discussing divisible divorce); 
MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 211 (discussing divisible divorce). 
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nerships do not create a status that is the equivalent of marriage.28 
But the presence of the status created by marriage in a state is what 
gives the state the right to divorce based on the domicile of the 
plaintiff alone.29 In the absence of the special status that marriage 
gives, therefore, State Y does not have the power under currently 
prevailing jurisdictional theory to declare the existence of a domestic 
partnership based on the domicile of the plaintiff alone. The state 
must have sufficient contacts between the state and the defendant to 
satisfy due process in the way that would be necessary in a non-
domestic relations case. 
Curiously, however, there is authority suggesting that if A and B 
were married, although State Y would not have the power to enter 
an “in personam”30 judgment against B, it would have the power to 
determine the ownership of the property brought to State Y by 
spouse A. For example, in Abernathy v. Abernathy,31 a husband and 
wife married in Florida and resided in Louisiana. They separated, and 
the husband moved to Georgia and purchased real property in Geor-
gia, using assets accumulated during the marriage and taken from 
Louisiana without his wife’s consent. The husband then commenced 
an action in Georgia to obtain a divorce and an award of the prop-
erty. The wife challenged the ability of the Georgia court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over her, but the trial court sustained jurisdic-
tion over the res of the marital relationship for purposes of granting 
the divorce and also exercised “in rem” jurisdiction over the property 
based on its presence in Georgia. 
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. As described above, the 
plaintiff’s domicile in Georgia was sufficient to sustain jurisdiction to 
divorce,32 but the power of the Georgia courts to make a property 
award presented a more difficult issue. The Supreme Court of the 
United States had previously held that the presence of property unre-
 
 28. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. a (discussing 
how both ceremonial and common law marriages result in rights and obligations not only be-
tween the parties, but also create a legal status that encompasses rights and responsibilities in 
relation to third parties and the state; domestic partnerships, in contrast, create rights only be-
tween the parties, not the special status-based relationships of marriage). 
 29. See supra note 26 and authorities therein cited and discussed. 
 30. An in personam judgment is one based on the court’s power over the defendant, as 
opposed to an in rem judgment, which is based on the court’s power over a thing such as 
property or a status. See supra note 26 and the authorities cited therein. 
 31. 482 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1997). 
 32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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lated to the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant—so-called “quasi 
in rem jurisdiction”—was an unconstitutional basis for an assertion 
of state-court jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.33 However, the Court’s opinion contained lan-
guage that carefully preserved the ability of a state to adjudicate 
claims directly concerning the property itself when the property is lo-
cated in the forum state.34 The Georgia Supreme Court relied on this 
language to sustain the ability of Georgia to adjudicate the owner-
ship of the marital property in Abernathy.35 
Abernathy raises the possibility that, even though State Y might 
not have status-based jurisdiction to declare the existence of a do-
mestic partnership, State Y might nevertheless have power to deter-
mine that the partnership exists as an incident of its power to adjudi-
cate the ownership of the property brought into the state by A. It is 
far from clear, however, that the United States Supreme Court 
would approve of the Abernathy result on the property issue.36 If 
not, the presence of the property alone in State Y would not be a 
sufficient basis for determining ownership of the property as against 
B, even if both States X and Y would agree that a domestic partner-
ship exists on the facts of the case. In the absence of the ability to ad-
judicate the ownership of the property, the court would not have 
power under existing authority to adjudicate the existence of the 
domestic partnership as an incident of its power over the property. In 
addition, B may be able to short-circuit A’s attempt to have State Y 
adjudicate the ownership of the property by commencing an action 
against A in State X. As noted earlier,37 State X could validly assert 
long-arm jurisdiction over A to adjudicate the existence of the do-
mestic partnership and make appropriate property and compensatory 
awards. As noted, such an in personam judgment would be entitled 
to enforcement in State Y under the general implementing statute, 
even though the judgment is based on a domestic partnership. 
 
 33. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 34. See id. at 207–08. 
 35. As the dissent in Abernathy pointed out, however, the Supreme Court had also indi-
cated that the location of property in the state might not support jurisdiction to adjudicate 
claims to the property itself if the property had been brought into the state without the 
owner’s consent. See Abernathy, 482 S.E.2d at 272 (Sears, J., dissenting). See also Shaffer, 
433 U.S. at 208 n.25. 
 36. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 37. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
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C. Judgments Derived from Same-Sex Partnerships 
As observed above, the ALI proposes to extend domestic part-
nership recognition to persons in same-sex relationships.38 The en-
forceability in other states of judgments based on same-sex domestic 
partnerships is more problematic than the enforceability of judg-
ments based on different-sex partnerships because of a special im-
plementing statute enacted by Congress in 1996. Known as the De-
fense of Marriage Act (DOMA),39 the statute provides that “[n]o 
State . . . shall be required to give effect to any . . . judicial proceed-
ing of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons 
of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such 
other State.”40 At the time of this writing, no court has yet inter-
preted the statute. As it is pertinent to same-sex domestic partner-
ships, the issue will be whether judgments derived from such part-
nerships are based on “relationship[s] . . . treated as a marriage.” As 
noted in the preceding subsection, the ALI proposals do not treat 
domestic partnerships as the full equivalent of marriage.41 Neverthe-
less, domestic partnerships are designed to create financial rights be-
tween domestic partners at the termination of their relationship that 
are the equivalent of the financial rights possessed by married per-
sons upon the dissolution of marriage.42 Thus, it is conceivable that a 
court might hold DOMA applicable to a judgment derived from a 
domestic partnership because it is based on a relationship “treated as 
a marriage” in this financial sense. 
The consequence of including same-sex domestic partnerships 
within DOMA would be that judgments derived from such partner-
ships would no longer be subject to the “same effect” command of 
the general implementing statute discussed in the preceding subsec-
 
 38. See supra note 2. 
 39. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 42. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, §§ 6.04 (stating that prop-
erty is domestic partnership property if it would have been marital property had the domestic 
partners been married during the period of the domestic partnership), 6.05 (stating that do-
mestic partnership property should be divided according to the Principles for the division of 
marital property), 6.06(1)(a) (stating that a domestic partner is entitled to compensatory pay-
ments on the same basis as a spouse). 
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tion.43 Instead, DOMA, as the controlling implementing statute, 
would permit, but not require, states other than the judgment-
rendering state to refuse to enforce such judgments. Thus, even 
though the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the general imple-
menting statute does not recognize a general public policy exception 
to the “same effect” command, under DOMA, a state could choose 
to apply such an exception under its own choice-of-law system to 
judgments based on same-sex partnerships. This would make judg-
ments based on same-sex domestic partnerships relatively valueless in 
situations in which one of the partners moves to another state that is 
hostile to same-sex partnerships and the peripatetic partner takes to 
the other state assets that the judgment awarded to the stay-behind 
partner. 
It is, however, possible to interpret DOMA in a manner that 
does not remove judgments based on same-sex domestic partner-
ships from the command of the general implementing statute. Con-
gress enacted DOMA during a recent controversy over the potential 
legalization of same-sex marriages by the State of Hawaii.44 The fear 
was that after legalization of such marriages in one state, other states 
would be compelled to recognize the marriages under the first sen-
tence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.45 As discussed in the next 
section, this fear was misplaced because the United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause in a minimalist fashion, thus posing little or no danger that 
states will be forced to recognize the validity of marriages performed 
 
 43. It should be noted that similar problems may exist with child custody and support 
awards made in favor of one same-sex partner and against another when the same-sex partner 
receiving the award has been awarded custody of and support for a child who was formerly a 
common child of the partners. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, §§ 
6.03(5) (defining common child for purposes of the domestic partnership provisions), 2.03 
(defining parent for purposes of the ALI Principles). Custody and support awards are con-
trolled by special implementing statutes under current law. See Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Full Faith and Credit for Child Sup-
port Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). DOMA may create exceptions 
to these statutes as well as to the general implementing statute in cases where same-sex partners 
dissolve their relationship and one of the partners is awarded custody of a common child of the 
former relationship and support for the child. Concededly, however, this is less likely than in 
the case of a property or compensatory award directly to one of the partners and against the 
other. The child was not in a relationship with the defendant that is treated as a marriage, even 
though the custodial parent was. 
 44. See generally, e.g., Whitten, Original Understanding and DOMA, supra note 11. 
 45. See id. 
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elsewhere that violate their strong public policy.46 Therefore, under 
current Supreme Court authorities, DOMA is largely unnecessary as 
applied to state choice-of-law decisions. 
The inclusion of court judgments within the statute is another 
matter, however. As noted above, the effect of including within the 
Act judgments (judicial proceedings) derived from same-sex relation-
ships treated as marriages is to remove such judgments from the 
“same effect” command of the general implementing statute. Certain 
arguments made by the proponents of same-sex marriage apparently 
motivated Congress to have DOMA apply to judgments derived 
from same-sex relationships treated as marriages. In a nutshell, the 
arguments were that same-sex partners could get married in a state 
where same-sex nuptials are permitted and solidify their marriages by 
obtaining declaratory judgments that they are married from courts in 
the same state.47 These arguments, however, were always preposter-
ous. In addition to the (perhaps overwhelming) problem of present-
ing a justiciable controversy to a court of the state where the mar-
riage was performed, it is impossible to see how a court in that state 
would have the jurisdiction to bind officials or private parties in 
other states with a judgment rendered in an action to which they 
were not, and could not be made, parties.48 Nevertheless, Congress 
responded to the arguments by including judgments derived from 
same-sex marriages within DOMA.49 
 
 46. See infra notes 52–71 and accompanying text. See also Ralph U. Whitten, The Con-
stitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. 
REV. 1 (1981). 
 47. See Habib A. Balian, Note, ’Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit 
to Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 404–05 (1995); Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-
Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limita-
tions on States’ Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages 
Following Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin, 32 LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551 (1993–94). The notion 
that a judgment would “solidify” the marriage is based on the fact that states have been re-
quired to enforce the judgments of other states stringently under the “same effect” command 
of the general implementing statute, but have been subject to far less stringent control when 
determining whether to apply another state’s statutes under the first sentence of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause. The reasons for this difference in treatment are historical and include the 
fact that the text of the first implementing statute applied the “same effect” command to 
judgments, but not to state statutes. See generally Whitten, Original Understanding and 
DOMA, supra note 11 (explaining the history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and imple-
menting statute as applied to state judgments and public acts). 
 48. See Whitten, Original Understanding and DOMA, supra note 11, at 390–91. 
 49. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 30 n.77 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2905 (describing the possibility that the proponents of same-sex marriages would adopt a 
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In the process, however, Congress may have included more 
within the Act than is desirable. For example, assume that in the fu-
ture a same-sex couple is married in a state permitting such unions, 
and one of the spouses is later killed in the same state by a nonresi-
dent. A wrongful death action brought by the surviving spouse sub-
sequently results in a valid judgment against the tortfeasor in the 
state. Enforcement of the judgment where the tortfeasor has assets, 
presumably in the tortfeasor’s home state, may no longer be a matter 
of right under the “same effect” command of the implementing stat-
ute because the judgment might be removed from that command by 
a broad interpretation of DOMA as applied to judgments.50 Never-
theless, it is difficult to see why Congress would want to reach such a 
result,51 and the better construction of DOMA would limit its inclu-
sion of judgments to the kind of evil at which Congress was aiming: 
a bogus declaratory judgment action in the state where the same-sex 
partners are wedded that is designed to force other states to accept 
the same-sex marriage contrary to their laws. If the interpretation of 
DOMA is so limited, legitimate judgments obtained in the same-sex 
domestic partnership context would, like those derived from same-
sex marriages, still fall within the “same effect” command of the gen-
eral implementing statute. If the courts ultimately adopt a broader 
interpretation of DOMA, however, the effect of a judgment derived 
from a same-sex domestic partnership will depend on a permissive 
conflict-of-laws decision of the state asked to enforce the judgment. 
 
strategy of obtaining declaratory judgments of marriage). 
 50. See Whitten, Original Understanding and DOMA, supra note 11, at 391 n.465. See 
also Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Inter-Jurisdictional Recog-
nition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 180–82 (1998); Andrew 
Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 
973–74 (1998). 
 51. The inclusion of this kind of judgment within the Act would not prevent a wrongful 
death action against the defendant. It would simply prevent the surviving same-sex partner 
from bringing, or perhaps benefiting from, the action. While there may be good reasons for 
preventing states or their residents from being forced by the laws of other states to accept mar-
riages they find morally offensive, there is no apparent interest on the part of a state such as the 
one described in the text to determine which of a number of nonresidents have the right to 
bring a wrongful death action under the law of another state or to benefit from it. That should 
be a matter for the state whose wrongful death law governs the controversy to decide. In this 
case, that state is the state of the decedent’s domicile, where the decedent was killed. 
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III. CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES CONCERNING  
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 
A. The Constitutional Context 
1. Existing standards 
The principal constitutional limitations on a state’s power to ap-
ply its own law to a case containing multi-state elements are con-
tained in the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Hague,52 a majority of the United States Supreme Court agreed that 
the test was the same under both clauses for determining whether a 
state could constitutionally apply its own law to a case. The test is 
whether the state has a sufficient contact or aggregation of contacts 
creating state interests that would make the application of its law nei-
ther arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.53 In Sun Oil Co. v. Wort-
man,54 however, the Court held that the Allstate test only applied to 
“nontraditional” choice-of-law decisions. When a state is applying a 
traditional choice-of-law rule—i.e., one that was accepted at the time 
the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses were ratified and 
whose acceptance has continued into the present—the choice-of-law 
rule is constitutionally valid without regard to the Allstate test. 
It is apparent that Allstate and Sun Oil place only modest restric-
tions on a state’s ability to apply its law to a case rather than the law 
of another state.55 The end result is that in most cases in which con-
flict-of-laws issues concerning domestic partnerships arise, the states 
will be free to give or refuse effect to the laws of other states in ac-
cord with their own conflict-of-laws systems without constitutional 
restraint. Thus, if two people cohabit in a state that would recognize 
them as domestic partners but move to a state that does not recog-
nize such partnerships, it is unlikely that the Due Process or Full 
Faith and Credit Clauses will require their new domicile to recognize 
any rights accruing under the law of their former domicile. The con-
tacts created by the parties’ establishment of a new domicile in an-
 
 52. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
 53. See id. at 312–13, 332. 
 54. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 55. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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other state will provide that state with a sufficient interest to apply its 
own law to their relationship rather than the law of the previous 
domicile. This, in turn, will allow their new domicile to reject finan-
cial claims by one of the parties against the other based on the do-
mestic partnership law of the former domicile. 
2. Potentially more restrictive standards 
Despite the minimalist approach the Supreme Court has taken to 
constitutional restrictions on state choice of law in Allstate and Sun 
Oil, it is important to recognize that further development of the 
Allstate standard is possible and may result in greater constitutional 
restrictions on state choice-of-law authority. In Allstate, a plurality of 
four justices applied the “significant contacts creating state interests” 
standard in a very general way to sustain Minnesota’s choice of its 
own law to govern an insurance issue.56 The plurality did not sepa-
rately examine the policies supporting the Due Process and Full 
Faith and Credit Clauses to determine whether those policies re-
stricted state choice-of-law authority in different ways. Nor did the 
plurality analyze Minnesota’s contacts closely to determine how they 
produced a governmental interest on the part of the state in applying 
its law to the particular issue.57 
A fifth Justice, John Paul Stevens, concurred in Allstate, but ar-
gued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected different interests 
and should be analyzed differently.58 To Justice Stevens, the Full 
 
 56. See id. at 302–20 (Brennan, J., concurring). The issue in the case was whether the 
uninsured motorist coverage under three automobile insurance policies of $15,000 per policy 
could be “stacked” to produce a total recovery of $45,000. The policies were issued in Wis-
consin, to a Wisconsin resident, and the accident in question occurred in Wisconsin and was 
entirely between Wisconsin residents. The action was brought in Minnesota after the widow of 
the decedent-owner of the policies moved there. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
Minnesota law, which permitted stacking, should be applied rather than Wisconsin law, and 
the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed this result. 
 57. See id. at 313–20. The contacts with Minnesota were (1) that the decedent, al-
though a Wisconsin resident who was killed in Wisconsin and to whom the automobile insur-
ance in question was issued in Wisconsin, worked in Minnesota; (2) Allstate did business in 
Minnesota; and (3) the decedent’s widow, who was the plaintiff in the action, moved to Min-
nesota after the accident. The majority simply counted these contacts without matching them 
carefully to the legal issue in the case to determine whether they produced a legitimate state 
interest on the part of Minnesota in controlling the issue with its law. 
 58. See id. at 320–32 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stewart did not participate in the 
decision of the case. See id. at 320. 
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Faith and Credit Clause was designed to transform the states from 
independent sovereigns into a single unified nation. The Clause does 
this by protecting the sovereign interests of the states from illegiti-
mate encroachment by other states.59 The Due Process Clause is de-
signed to protect individuals from choice-of-law decisions that result 
in unfair surprise by producing the application of a law to the indi-
viduals that could not have been anticipated at the time they en-
gaged in the conduct that is the subject of the litigation.60 
Three other justices dissented in Allstate.61 These justices agreed 
with the plurality that the “significant contacts creating state inter-
ests” standard governed state choice-of-law decisions under both the 
Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses. However, in apply-
ing the standard, the dissenters separated their analysis under each 
clause and applied it more rigorously than did the plurality. This was 
done in an attempt to measure whether the contacts with Minnesota 
were sufficient to create interests in applying its law to the particular 
issue under each constitutional clause. Taking this approach, the dis-
senters concluded that the contacts between a state and the litigation 
must be assessed in light of the policy of the Due Process Clause to 
prevent defeat of the expectations of the parties (or unfair surprise)62 
and the policy of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to assure that a 
state must have sufficient connection with the facts giving rise to the 
litigation to implicate the legitimate scope of its lawmaking jurisdic-
tion.63 Under this approach, the dissenters found that the application 
of Minnesota law did not violate the Due Process Clause,64 but that 
 
 59. See id. at 322–26 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, although viewing Min-
nesota’s decision to apply its own law unsound as a matter of choice of law, opined that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause was not violated because the insurance contract in question obvi-
ously envisioned that the law of other states might be applied to the contract. Thus, the appli-
cation of Minnesota law did not threaten Wisconsin’s sovereignty. 
 60. See id. at 326–31. Justice Stevens felt that due process was not violated by the appli-
cation of Minnesota’s law because the rule followed was the majority rule throughout the 
United States and the parties could have envisioned that a law other than that of Wisconsin, 
where the policy was issued, might be applied to the insurance policy. See id. at 327–29. 
 61. See id. at 332–40 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 62. See id. at 333–34. 
 63. See id. at 334. 
 64. See id. at 336. In essence, the dissenters found that there could be no unfair surprise 
to the parties for the same reason as found by Justice Stevens: the risk insured by the defendant 
was not geographically limited; therefore, the defendant could have anticipated that the law of 
some state other than Wisconsin, where the policy was issued, could eventually be applied to 
determine its liabilities under the policy. 
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the contacts between Minnesota and the litigation were insufficient 
to give it an interest in applying its public policies. In drawing the 
latter conclusion, the dissenters examined the contacts between 
Minnesota and the litigation and concluded that none of them justi-
fied application of the state’s substantive law to the particular issue in 
question.65 
The approach of Justice Stevens, when combined with that of 
the dissenters, belies the apparent agreement of a majority of the 
Court on a uniform standard under the Full Faith and Credit and 
Due Process Clauses. There is obviously a possibility that a majority 
of the Court may at some future date separate the policies support-
ing the two clauses and insist that they be separately satisfied in each 
case by a close matching of the forum’s contacts with the legal issues 
involved in the action. That is, the Court may insist on an analysis of 
the contacts between a state and the litigation that would both pre-
vent unfair surprise to the defendant and provide a realistic connec-
tion between the state’s lawmaking prerogatives and the substantive 
issues in the action. If this is so, the Allstate standard may result in 
greater restrictions on state choice-of-law decisions than exist pres-
ently. At least one subsequent Supreme Court decision seems to 
confirm this, emphasizing especially the need to prevent defeat of the 
expectations of the parties under the Due Process Clause.66 
Although it is difficult to determine how an expanded Allstate67 
 
 65. See id. at 337–40. The only contact that might have created a state interest in apply-
ing a law permitting stacking, and therefore, a higher recovery to the plaintiff, was the plain-
tiff’s residence in Minnesota. However, in the dissenters’ view, this contact was not relevant, 
because the plaintiff had moved to Minnesota after the events giving rise to suit. The other 
contacts were that Allstate did business in the state and that the decedent worked in the state. 
However, while the dissenters agreed that these contacts would be relevant to the application 
of some of the state’s laws, they were not relevant to the particular issue—stacking—that was 
the subject of the litigation. 
 66. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), the Court applied the 
Allstate test to invalidate the application of Kansas law to the claims of plaintiff class members 
that had arisen outside Kansas and had no contacts with Kansas. The Court’s analysis was not 
entirely illuminating, but in holding the application of Kansas law invalid, the Court did em-
phasize the expectations portion of Justice Powell’s dissent. See id. at 822. 
 67. As discussed below, there is no “traditional” conflict-of-laws rule—i.e., one accepted 
at the time the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses were ratified and whose accep-
tance has continued into the present—that the states might apply to domestic partnerships, 
because such partnerships were unknown at the time the clauses were created. Thus, while 
there are analogies that may be drawn under a traditional conflict-of-laws system to assist a 
state court in determining how to evaluate domestic partnerships, the Sun Oil case would ap-
pear to be largely irrelevant to such partnerships. 
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standard might impact on domestic partnerships cases, it seems 
unlikely that the standard will be expanded sufficiently to create ma-
jor restrictions on the power of the states either to apply or to disre-
gard such partnerships. As noted above, the domicile of one or both 
of the parties will ordinarily be sufficient, even under an expanded 
standard, to provide a contact necessary to satisfy the Full Faith and 
Credit and Due Process Clauses, whether the state is applying or re-
fusing to apply the domestic partnership law of another state. The 
situation will be rare in which application of forum law would either 
infringe upon the sovereign interests of another state or would defeat 
the expectations of the defendant. The problem case will be one in 
which, like Allstate, the plaintiff moves to a state having domestic 
partnership legislation after the events have occurred that would give 
rise to the partnership.68 
Thus, assume that State X does not recognize domestic partner-
ships. A and B are domiciled in State X and cohabit there under cir-
cumstances that would make them domestic partners under the ALI 
domestic partnership proposals. The parties then separate, and A 
moves to State Y, which recognizes domestic partnerships under the 
circumstances proposed by the ALI. While on a temporary visit to 
State Y, a state to which she has never been before, B is served with 
process in an action by A in State Y to obtain recognition that A and 
B are domestic partners under State Y law and to obtain a money 
judgment against B. Although the personal service on B while B is 
physically present in State Y validly subjects B to the jurisdiction of 
the State Y courts under the Due Process Clause,69 substantial doubt 
exists whether the contacts between State Y, the parties, and the 
events giving rise to suit would be sufficient to satisfy the constitu-
tional restrictions on State Y’s ability to apply its domestic partner-
ship law to B under an expanded Allstate standard. 
A’s newly acquired domicile in State Y may or may not give the 
state an adequate interest to satisfy the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
Under the approach taken by Justice Stevens, the change of domicile 
might or might not be sufficient to satisfy the Constitution,70 but 
 
 68. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 336 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 69. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 70. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 324 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens seemed 
in the cited footnote to merge the expectational interests under the Due Process Clause and 
the sovereign interests under the Full Faith and Credit Clause on the facts of the case. The case 
involved a contract, however, and Justice Stevens equated expectational party interests with 
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under the approach taken by the dissenters it surely would not be.71 
Nevertheless, even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause would be satis-
fied by A’s domicile in State Y, it is difficult to see how the applica-
tion of State Y domestic partnership law could not, under an unfair 
surprise standard, violate the Due Process Clause. The parties resided 
in State X when the events necessary to give rise to the domestic 
partnership occurred. All other things being equal, it is not reason-
able to suppose that B could fairly have contemplated that she would 
be held liable to A under the law of a state other than State X, espe-
cially one with which she then had no contact whatsoever. 
Of course, one must keep in mind that the scenario described 
above, or anything resembling it, will be rare. In other cases, even an 
expanded Allstate standard will not limit the power of a state to ap-
ply its law to domestic partnership cases with which it has more sub-
stantial contacts. In such cases, the original conclusion, drawn 
above,72 will hold true: state choice-of-law doctrine, unrestricted by 
the United States Constitution, will be the major determinant of the 
recognition of domestic partnerships in multi-state situations. 
3. Other constitutional problems 
In addition to the constitutional limits recognized in the Sun Oil 
and Allstate cases, courts have sometimes identified constitutional re-
strictions on the power of states to deprive a party of property rights 
based simply on a change of domicile from one state to another. For 
example, a state may not, consistent with due process, change the 
separate property of one spouse into community property solely on 
the basis that it has been brought into the state.73 Similarly, spouses 
may not be deprived of their undivided one-half ownership of com-
munity property merely by moving with it from one state to an-
other.74 However, events occurring after removal of the property 
from one state to another, such as divorce of the spouses, can pro-
 
state interests in having the contract interpreted according to Wisconsin law by observing that 
the contract covered events that might occur in other states. This might not be possible in a 
case involving a domestic partnership. 
 71. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 337–40. 
 72. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 73. See In re Thornton’s Estate, 33 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1934); MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 
12, § 219 (Marital Property: Removal of Goods or Change of Domicile). 
 74. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 219 (Marital Property: Removal of Goods 
or Change of Domicile). 
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vide a basis upon which a state may make an award of one spouse’s 
property to the other spouse.75 
Thus, assume that spouses move from a separate to a community 
property state, with the husband owning property classified as his 
separate property in the former state of residence. After the move, 
the wife commences a divorce proceeding against the husband. The 
fact of the move itself does not allow the community state automati-
cally to convert the husband’s separate property into community, 
with the wife owning an undivided one-half interest in the property. 
However, the divorce does allow the community property state to 
take one-half of the husband’s property and award it to the wife as 
part of the divorce judgment.76 
The property rules described above impose few restrictions on 
the power of states to apply their own law to unmarried persons in 
domestic partnership situations. The existence of a domestic partner-
ship, unaided by contract, only becomes relevant upon the dissolu-
tion of the relationship. Thus, under traditional theory no property 
rights would vest in either of the partners under domestic partner-
ship law until a court allocates the property between them pursuant 
to a judgment brought in a proceeding to recognize the partnership. 
For example, assume that two persons cohabit in a state that 
would recognize them as domestic partners, with one of them accu-
mulating substantial property that would be classified as that per-
son’s separate property if the parties were married. The partners 
move to a state that does not recognize domestic partnerships. No 
property rights were vested in the non-owning partner before the 
move, and the move in and of itself changes nothing. Upon dissolu-
tion of the relationship, there is, under current precedent, no consti-
tutional requirement that the new state of residence must recognize 
financial rights that would have existed under the law of the former 
domicile. Of course, a new domicile could, under a domestic part-
nership law of its own, provide for a property award that resulted in 
one of the partner’s property being taken and distributed to the 
other, but this would be done as a matter of the state’s own choice-
of-law discretion, not as a matter of constitutional compulsion. Thus, 
if the parties move from a state that does not recognize domestic 
partnerships to one that does, the domicile of the parties in the new 
 
 75. See id. § 220 (Marital Property: New Events After Removal (Incidents of Title)). 
 76. See id. 
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state coupled with the dissolution of the parties’ relationship would 
be sufficient to allow a court of the state to apply its own law to the 
dissolution and allocate the property of one partner to the other, just 
as in the case of a married couple that moved to the state and then 
divorced.77 
B. Opposite-Sex Domestic Partnerships and  
State Choice-of-Law Doctrine 
In making judgments about the conflicts problems that will arise 
from domestic partnerships, it is important to keep in mind the simi-
larities and differences between domestic partnerships and marriage. 
Marriage has a rich conflict-of-laws history, but domestic partnership 
has none. The normal approach to selecting the applicable law in a 
domestic partnership case would be to analogize a domestic partner-
ship to a marriage. However, because the analogies are not complete, 
courts making choice-of-law decisions in domestic partnership cases 
may not always be able to rely entirely on marriage conflicts princi-
ples. Thus, the analogy to marriage will be more or less useful de-
pending upon the conflict-of-laws system being used by a state. 
There are a number of conflict-of-laws systems in current use in 
the United States. In addition, within each system, there are signifi-
cant variations in how the courts apply the system. Space limitations 
prevent an exhaustive application of all the systems to domestic part-
nerships in this article. Instead, the examination below will be lim-
ited to the principal systems in use today. These are: (1) the “vested 
rights” or territorial system of the first Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws; (2) the “most significant relationship” analysis of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws; (3) existing variations of the sys-
tem of “interest analysis” created by Professor Brainerd Currie; and 
(4) the system of choice-influencing considerations created by Pro-
fessor Robert Leflar. 
 
 77. Other constitutional limits on choice of law, such as the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, which is designed to prevent states from discriminating 
against citizens of other states, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which is designed to protect against discrimination 
against persons within a state’s jurisdiction, would not, as currently interpreted, place greater 
constitutional limits on a state’s power to apply its law than the Full Faith and Credit and Due 
Process Clauses, at least not in the situations described. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 
12, §§ 50–54 (discussing the constitutional framework generally). 
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1. The “vested rights” system 
When parties dissolve a marriage by divorce, the traditional ap-
proach in the United States has been for the divorcing forum to ap-
ply its own substantive law of divorce rather than the divorce law of 
any other state.78 However, for a divorce to be granted, the parties 
being divorced must be validly married. Whether they are validly 
married is not automatically determined by the substantive marriage 
law of the divorcing state. Rather, the traditional approach has been 
to determine the validity of a marriage by reference to the law of the 
state where the marriage was performed.79 Even under the traditional 
rule, a marriage valid where performed but contrary to the strong 
public policy of the state of the parties’ domicile would be consid-
ered invalid everywhere.80 In addition, the “state of contracting” rule 
only applies in cases of marriages that are formally performed in a 
state. Common law marriages arise from the cohabitation of two per-
sons who hold themselves out as man and wife, but such marriages 
are not recognized everywhere. Nevertheless, under traditional con-
flicts doctrine, common law marriages were treated as valid every-
where if the acts that created the marriage occurred in a state that 
recognizes such marriages as valid.81 A public policy exception to the 
general conflicts rule governing common law marriages also exists, 
 
 78. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 203 (Divorce: Grounds). Some states are 
attempting to make divorce more difficult by providing for so-called “covenant marriages,” 
under which parties essentially agree at the time they are married that they may not be di-
vorced except under more restrictive standards than those applied to non-covenant marriages. 
It is not clear at this time whether other states will honor such laws when one or both of the 
parties to the marriage migrate to the other states and then seek divorce under the more per-
missive divorce laws of the other states. See id. (discussing Louisiana and Arizona covenant 
marriage laws); Katherine Shaw Spaht & Symeon C. Symeonides, Covenant Marriage and the 
Law of Conflicts of Laws, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1085 (1999); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Lou-
isiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 64 (1998); 
Melissa S. LaBauve, Comment, Covenant Marriages: A Guise for Lasting Commitment?, 43 
LOY. L. REV. 421 (1997). 
 79. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (1934); MCDOUGAL ET AL., su-
pra note 12, § 204 (General Validity of Marriages). Some states have dealt with the problem of 
marriage recognition by statute. Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, § 210, 9A (pt. 
1) U.L.A. 159, 194 (1998), marriages contracted in the state adopting the act or outside the 
state that were either valid “at the time of the contract” or subsequently validated by the laws 
of the place in which they were contracted or by the domicile of the parties are valid in the 
contracting state. 
 80. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934). 
 81. See id. § 123; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 
cmts. f & g (1971). 
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although, in the nature of the institution, it is far less likely that a 
situation would arise in which a common law marriage could be val-
idly formed by a relationship in one state that would violate the 
strong policy of another. Nevertheless, presumably a common law 
marriage that is, for example, incestuous under the law of the forum 
would be considered invalid.82 
Domestic partnerships, unlike marriages, do not have to be for-
mally dissolved by divorce. Indeed, the question of whether a non-
contractually aided domestic partnership exists only becomes relevant 
when the parties themselves have decided to end their cohabitation. 
At that time, one of the partners may assert a claim for financial relief 
against another, and the court asked to grant relief will determine 
whether the domestic partnership exists as part of determining 
whether the claim for relief is valid. It is at that time that the court 
will be faced with a choice-of-law question when the parties to the 
suit have, or have had, contacts with multiple states during their rela-
tionship. 
Under the “vested rights” system of the first Restatement, the 
closest conflicts analogy for domestic partnerships is the rule dealing 
with common law marriages. Thus, a state following the first Re-
statement system might analogize a domestic partnership to a com-
mon law marriage and recognize it as valid if “the acts alleged to 
have created it took place in a state in which such a [domestic part-
nership] is valid.”83 Assume that A and B reside in State X, which 
recognizes domestic partnerships. They cohabit there under circum-
stances in which they would be recognized as domestic partners but 
later move to State Y, which does not recognize domestic partner-
ships. By analogy to the traditional rule governing common law mar-
riages, State Y might recognize A and B as domestic partners under 
the law of State X, as long as such recognition does not violate the 
strong public policy of State Y. 
The two points of doubt in the preceding discussion involve the 
initial determination to recognize the domestic partnership by anal-
ogy to common law marriages and the application of the public pol-
icy exception. Once a common law marriage is formed, it creates a 
marriage status for all purposes, just like a formally performed mar-
riage. The common law marriage thus generates not only rights be-
 
 82. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132(b) (1934). 
 83. See id. § 123. 
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tween the parties, but also rights and obligations with reference to 
third persons and public officials. Domestic partnerships create no 
similar status. Consequently, a court might determine that, because 
domestic partnerships only become relevant when the parties termi-
nate their relationship, the law of the state where the parties are 
domiciled at the time they seek recognition of the partnership, or 
perhaps even the law of the forum where such recognition is sought, 
should always govern the validity of the partnership. Alternatively, a 
court might determine that the length of time that the partners re-
side in State Y is relevant to determining whether their partnership 
should be recognized. If they seek recognition of the partnership 
shortly after moving to State Y, having spent the bulk of their rela-
tionship in State X, the court might be willing to recognize the part-
nership. However, if the parties spend several years in State Y before 
seeking recognition of the partnership, the court might be less will-
ing to hold that their relationship should be governed by the law of a 
state other than State Y merely because it originated in that other 
state. 
As far as the public policy exception is concerned, its application 
in State Y to a domestic partnership formed in State X is difficult to 
predict. If the State Y court conceptualizes State Y’s refusal to recog-
nize domestic partnerships as based on a policy of preserving the in-
tegrity of traditional marriage, it might hold a domestic partnership 
invalid because it violates the Y policy, even though it was valid un-
der State X law. On the other hand, if the court simply views the ab-
sence of domestic partnerships in State Y as the byproduct of legisla-
tive or other lawmaking inertia, it might not view the partnership as 
violating any strong public policy of Y. 
It should also be noted that, in cases of traditional marriage, the 
application of the strong public policy exception varies depending on 
the issue involved in the action. Thus, assume A and B are two six-
teen-year-olds who live in State X, which forbids marriage before the 
age of eighteen. They travel to State Y, which allows marriages be-
tween sixteen-year-olds, and there marry, returning to State X to live 
thereafter. Whether a court in State X would void the marriage un-
der a strong public policy exception might well depend on whether 
one of the parties is seeking an annulment or is claiming a spouse’s 
share of the other party’s estate. A court is much more likely to apply 
a strong public policy exception to the issue of annulment than to 
14WHI.DOC 12/5/01  2:32 AM 
1235] Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships 
 1261 
the case of the spouse’s share.84 Because recognition of a domestic 
partnership is always undertaken in the context of determining finan-
cial claims by one partner against the other, including both equitable 
property division and compensation issues, it could be that the 
strong public policy exception will less often be applied to prevent 
such claims.85 
2. The most significant relationship test 
Under the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws, marriages are valid if they are valid under the law of the state 
that has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the mar-
riage.86 This latter approach will normally validate a marriage that 
satisfies the law of the state where the marriage is contracted, unless 
the marriage violates the strong public policy of another state that 
has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage 
at the time it is performed.87 The significant relationship test involves 
the identification of the contacts of the relevant states with the par-
ties and events giving rise to suit and the determination of the state 
of the most significant relationship to the issue involved in the case 
by matching those contacts with a set of factors listed in section 6 of 
 
 84. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 205 (Marriages: Strong Local Public Pol-
icy). 
 85. See id. Other problems that may occur under the vested rights system include the 
problem of characterizing issues under the ALI Principles as substantive or procedural. For 
example, § 6.03(3) of the Principles establishes a rebuttable presumption that persons are do-
mestic partners if they maintain a common household for a cohabitation period set forth in a 
uniform rule of statewide application. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 
6.03(3); see also id. §§ 6.03(6) (burden of proof when other provisions not satisfied), 6.03(7) 
(factors determining whether persons have shared a life together as a couple). Even if a forum 
that does not recognize domestic partnerships is willing to apply the law of a state that does 
recognize such partnerships, the forum might characterize such provisions as “procedural” and 
thus governed by forum law under the vested rights system. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra 
note 12, § 110 (discussing characterization). This problem can also occur in the other systems 
discussed below. A forum court operating under any modern system can evaluate certain rules 
as primarily concerned with judicial administration and thus controlled by forum law rather 
than the rules of the state of the otherwise applicable substantive law. Similarly, a forum can, 
even while recognizing that certain procedural rules of the state of the otherwise applicable law 
have outcome determinative effects, consider it too burdensome to import such rules into ad-
judications in the forum’s courts, or consider that the forum’s own procedural policies would 
be undermined by importing the outcome determinative procedural rules of another state into 
forum adjudications. See id. §§ 110–119 (discussing the problems of evaluating conflict-of-
laws questions concerning a variety of procedural matters). 
 86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(1) (1971). 
 87. See id. § 283(2). 
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the Restatement (Second).88 Like the “vested rights” system, the Re-
statement (Second) approach would also recognize the validity of 
common law marriages “[i]f the acts relied upon to create the mar-
riage meet the requirements of the state where the acts took place.”89 
However, a common law marriage is invalid under the Restatement 
(Second) if the strong public policy of a state that had the most sig-
nificant relationship between the spouses and the marriage at the 
time of the marriage requires certain formalities to create a valid mar-
riage.90 
Assume that A and B are domiciled in State X, which treats as in-
cestuous and void marriages between persons standing in their kin-
ship relationship. A and B travel to State Y, which recognizes mar-
riages between persons related as they are, and there marry, 
returning to State X to live thereafter. Under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) approach, State X might hold the marriage between A and B 
void under its strong public policy because it is clearly the state of 
the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at 
the time of the marriage. However, under the Restatement (Sec-
ond), as under the “vested rights” approach, the application of the 
public policy exception may depend on the issue involved in the ac-
tion in which marriage validity is questioned. If the issue is whether 
the marriage should be annulled, there would be a great likelihood 
that the public policy exception would be invoked to invalidate the 
 
 88. The Restatement (Second) system is somewhat more complicated than this. The 
Restatement (Second), in most of its chapters, actually contains certain black-letter rules, gen-
erally referred to as containing “presumptive choices.” In applying the most significant rela-
tionship approach, these rules of presumptive choice are supposed to be identified first, and the 
court is then supposed to determine whether the section 6 factors, given the contacts of the 
involved states with the case, indicate that some other state’s law should be applied instead of 
that of the state of presumptive choice. See, e.g., Martineau v. Guertin, 751 A.2d 776 (Vt. 
2000) (stating that “the first step [under the Restatement (Second)] is to ascertain whether a 
specific section governs what law should ordinarily apply to the particular action or legal issue,” 
and “[i]f such a section exists, generally the law of [that] state is presumed to be the correct 
forum unless another state has a more significant interest in the litigation.”) Id. at 778; 
LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 48–49 
(3d ed. 1998). In the marriage area, section 283 of the Restatement (Second) contains the 
presumptively applicable jurisdiction-selecting rule, and that rule incorporates by reference the 
most significant relationship test of section 6. 
 89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. g (1971). 
 90. See id. cmt. f. Presumably, also, the strong public policy of a state that has the most 
significant relationship with the parties and the marriage could also invalidate the marriage on 
other grounds, such as incest. 
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marriage.91 On the other hand, if the issue is whether A is entitled to 
letters of administration upon the death of B as B’s surviving spouse 
(as opposed to a child of the marriage being entitled to the letters), 
it seems less likely that the public policy exception would be applied 
to void the marriage.92 
In applying the Restatement (Second) system to domestic part-
nerships, the first thing to note is that, as with the “vested rights” 
system, common law marriage seems to be the most pertinent anal-
ogy in determining validity. Both common law marriage and domes-
tic partnerships are the product of extended relationships. Thus, no 
equivalent of an act of formal marriage occurs within a state to gov-
ern the validity of a domestic partnership. Consequently, validity 
must be governed by reference to the state where the acts alleged to 
give rise to the domestic partnership occur, just as in cases of com-
mon law marriage. Assuming that such acts occur in a state where 
domestic partnerships are recognized and the partners are domiciled, 
a domestic partnership exists in an objective sense, even though it 
has yet to be declared by a court. If the partners then move to an-
other state that does not recognize domestic partnerships, it would 
be difficult to hold that the new state could void the partnership on 
the grounds that some other state had a more significant relationship 
to the partners and the partnership at the time it was formed. Given 
the extended nature of the relationship required to form a domestic 
partnership,93 it seems unlikely in the extreme that such a partnership 
could be created in any state but the state of the most significant re-
lationship with the partners and the partnership at the time of the 
creation. 
Nevertheless, as with the “vested rights” approach, questions ex-
ist about whether courts in Restatement (Second) states would agree 
 
 91. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 92. Cf. In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953) (refusing to void the marriage 
under circumstances similar to those described in the text, though not under the “most signifi-
cant contacts” analysis). 
 93. The ALI envisions that the partners will have to share a primary residence and a life 
together as a couple for a significant period. This will either be a continuous period under a 
uniform rule of statewide application called (1) the cohabitation parenting period during which 
the parties maintain a household with their common child for a period of time set out in a uni-
form rule of statewide application, or (2) the cohabitation period, during which they maintain 
a common household for a period of time set in a uniform rule of statewide application. Alter-
natively, the couple will have to share a primary residence and a life together for a significant 
period of time. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(2), (3) & (6). 
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that marriage, even common law marriage, is an apt analogy to do-
mestic partnerships. Because domestic partnerships, unlike marriages, 
become relevant only when the partners dissolve their relationship, it 
is conceivable that courts will apply the law of the state of the most 
significant relationship to the partners at the time of the dissolution, 
rather than that of some state where the partners formerly resided. 
As under the “vested rights” system, it also may be relevant under 
the Restatement (Second) how long the partners have resided in the 
forum and, concomitantly, how long they have been absent from the 
state where the acts giving rise to the partnership occurred. 
It is also conceivable that courts in Restatement (Second) states 
will not apply the public policy exception in quite the way envisioned 
by the Restatement (Second’s) drafters. They might instead simply 
apply a strong public policy exception of the forum to void a domes-
tic partnership, even if the forum was not the state of the most sig-
nificant relationship to the partners and the partnership at the time 
of the acts giving rise to the partnership.94 Diverse application of the 
Restatement (Second’s) requirements is commonplace,95 and one 
should not expect uniform application of the requirements in the 
domestic partnership context. The public policy exception itself is a 
notorious “escape device,” which has been used unpredictably by 
courts to avoid results they find unpalatable.96 There is no reason to 
 
 94. It should also be noted that more complex situations than the simple situations set 
out in the text can occur and complicate the choice-of-law inquiry. For example, the parties 
may reside for a time in a non-domestic partnership state. They may then take up residence in a 
domestic partnership state for an additional period. This would give rise to a question whether 
the latter state would allow tacking of the two periods to meet its requirements for a suffi-
ciently significant period of time. But what if this question arises in still a third, non-domestic 
partnership state, or in a domestic partnership state with different time requirements than the 
original domestic partnership state? Gratefully, there is not space enough or time to take up all 
these questions in this article. 
 95. One commentator has observed that most courts following the Restatement (Sec-
ond) seem to ignore the presumptive jurisdiction-selecting rules in favor of the more fluid gen-
eral provisions of section 6. See Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restate-
ment: Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232 (1997). However, it 
is clear that some courts simply count contacts with the involved states rather than engaging in 
the more “sophisticated, dialectical process of evaluating the policies listed in section 6 in light 
of the pertinent factual contacts.” Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Sec-
ond Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1272 (1997). This fluid 
and varied approach indicates that the courts do not apply the Restatement (Second) in pre-
cisely the way envisioned by its drafters. 
 96. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 80 (Characterization and Other Escape 
Devices). 
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expect its application to be uniform and predictable under the Re-
statement (Second). 
3. Governmental interest analysis 
Unlike the “vested rights” system of the Restatement of Con-
flicts and the “most significant relationship” analysis of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflicts, the system of governmental interest 
analysis devised by the late Professor Brainerd Currie97 is a “unilat-
eral” conflict-of-laws system.98 Under unilateral conflict-of-laws sys-
tems, courts examine the laws of the potentially concerned states to 
determine whether their scope is sufficiently broad to call for their 
application to the case. Unlike multilateral systems (such as those of 
the Restatement and Restatement (Second)), unilateral systems ac-
knowledge that it may be justifiable for more than one state’s law to 
apply to a case.99 If two states both apply the same unilateral system 
in the same way, they could each wind up applying their own law to 
a case.100 
Thus, under governmental interest analysis, a court examines the 
policies supporting the laws of the involved states to determine 
whether those policies would be furthered by their application to the 
case before the court. If the court determines that only one state’s 
policies would be furthered by applying its law, only that state has a 
governmental interest in having its law applied. This is a “false con-
flict,” which requires the application of the law of the only interested 
state. If more than one of the involved states would have the policies 
of its law furthered, and if the laws point to different results, then 
there is a “true conflict.” Subject to certain exceptions not important 
here, when the forum is faced with a true conflict, it is to apply its 
own law to the case.101 It is important to note that no state currently 
 
 97. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(1963); see also MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 85 (Governmental Interest Analysis). 
 98. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law 
Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309, 1316–17 (1999). 
 99. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.12, at 17 (1995) [hereinafter 
BRILMAYER]; FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 13 
(1993). 
 100. See Ralph U. Whitten, Curing the Deficiencies of the Conflicts Revolution: A Pro-
posal for National Legislation on Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and Judgments, 37 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 259, 265–66 (2001). 
 101. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 85 (Governmental Interest Analysis). 
14WHI.DOC 12/5/01  2:32 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1266 
follows this pure form of interest analysis. However, some states do 
follow variations of interest analysis that seek to resolve true conflicts 
by use of balancing tests or other methodologies.102 
Applying governmental interest analysis to domestic partnerships, 
consider again the situation in which A and B cohabit in State X, 
which recognizes domestic partnerships, and later move to State Y, 
which rejects such partnerships. The parties then separate, and A sues 
B in a State Y court, seeking recognition of the partnership under the 
law of State X and a division of the partnership property and com-
pensation from B. Under these circumstances, the court in State Y 
would have to determine whether the policies of State X’s domestic 
partnership law would be furthered by applying them to A and B, 
even though the parties have now reestablished their domicile in 
State Y. Assuming that State Y determines that State X has an inter-
est in having its law applied to the case, it would then have to deter-
mine whether its own failure to recognize domestic partnerships gave 
rise to a policy that would also be furthered by applying it to the 
case. If either State X or Y does not have a policy that would be fur-
thered on the facts of the case, but the other state does, a false con-
flict exists, and the State Y court should apply the law of the only in-
terested state. If both states have policies that would be furthered by 
applying them to the case, and if the policies point to different re-
sults, a true conflict exists that would, in a pure system of interest 
analysis, require State Y to apply its own law. In a system of interest 
analysis that requires resolution of true conflicts, say by a balancing 
of the interests of the two states, State Y would have to assign weight 
to its own interests and those of State X in order to resolve the con-
flict. 
Although it may seem clear that State X has a policy that would 
be furthered on the facts given, this may not be so under conven-
tional interest analysis. Interest analysis tends to be domiciliary ori-
ented. That is, the policies supporting a state’s law are generally as-
sumed to be aimed at benefiting the state’s citizens. Applied 
narrowly, this can mean that a state will consider its policies fur-
thered by the application of its law only when one or both of the 
parties are domiciled within the state.103 If interest analysis is applied 
 
 102. See Whitten, supra note 100, at 274 nn.43–44 (describing New Jersey’s system of 
interest analysis and California’s system of comparative impairment analysis). 
 103. Cf. BRILMAYER, supra note 99, § 2.1.2, at 58–60 (1991) (discussing the general 
effect of domicile in producing true and false conflicts, as well as other cases that can arise un-
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in this manner, State X would not be deemed to have an interest in 
applying its domestic partnership law because A and B are not domi-
ciled there at the time of the suit, even though they were domiciled 
there for a sufficient period of time, and under proper circumstances, 
to qualify as domestic partners if they had remained in the state. 
State X would, therefore, not have an interest in applying its law to 
partners no longer domiciled in the state. 
Even if State X would recognize an “altruistic” interest in apply-
ing its law to A and B,104 there exists a separate problem of how to 
characterize State Y’s interest. Does the mere absence of a domestic 
partnership law in State Y give rise to a policy against such partner-
ships in order, e.g., to protect State Y defendants such as B?105 Alter-
natively, should a State Y court conclude that the mere absence of a 
domestic partnership law does not reflect any particular policy, but 
perhaps only legislative inertia?106 If the court in State Y is—or has 
been—asked to recognize domestic partnerships as part of the state’s 
common law and has refused to do so on the grounds that such rec-
ognition is more appropriate for legislative action, should this separa-
tion of powers concern translate into a policy against domestic part-
nerships, thus creating a true conflict with the altruistic law of state 
X? 
These questions are difficult enough to answer as applied to even 
the simple hypothetical set out in the text above, but there are nu-
merous other difficulties that will exist in determining how interest 
analysis will be applied to domestic partnership cases. For instance, as 
indicated above,107 in no existing system of interest analysis do courts 
 
der interest analysis). 
 104. See id. § 2.4.1 (discussing altruism in interest analysis). More accurately, since State 
Y is the forum, it would have to conclude that State X’s policies extend to non-domiciliaries 
and that State X has an altruistic interest, a potentially difficult problem of interpretation for a 
State Y court, especially if State X has never decided a case on all fours with the one under liti-
gation. 
 105. Courts employing interest analysis have sometimes deduced policies and corre-
sponding interests from the absence of laws in particular states on little if any evidence. See, 
e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978) (finding the absence of 
a law in Louisiana providing for recovery by a corporation for an injury to a key employee to 
be based in part on a policy of encouraging corporations to do business in Louisiana free from 
fear that they could be held liable for injuries they inflict on the key employees of others). 
 106. Of course, if the State Y legislature has refused to enact a domestic partnership law 
in statutory form, it is conceivable, despite the dangers of drawing conclusions from legislative 
inaction, that State Y might derive a policy against such partnerships from the refusal. 
 107. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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simply apply forum law when faced with true conflicts. All existing 
systems seek to resolve true conflicts by some device such as a 
balancing test.108 Because courts applying such tests seldom give in-
structions about how to attach weight to their own or another state’s 
interests, even greater uncertainty exists about how domestic part-
nerships will be treated in real-life interest analysis systems than un-
der theoretical, but “pure,” interest analysis. At least in the latter 
kind of system, once a court identifies a true conflict, one knows that 
forum law will apply. Admitting the uncertainty, however, the im-
portant point to make here is that there is ample room for courts op-
erating under existing schemes of interest analysis either to accept or 
reject the law of other states providing for domestic partnerships. 
4. Choice-influencing considerations 
The late Professor Robert A. Leflar identified five choice-
influencing considerations that courts might employ in either of two 
ways.109 The courts might specifically apply the considerations to the 
facts of a case to produce a decision, or they might use the choice-
influencing considerations as a check list against which to test 
whether other approaches to choice of law were operating properly 
in the case.110 However, the courts have generally ignored the check-
list approach and employed the choice-influencing considerations as 
specific determinants of decision.111 
The considerations are: (1) predictability of results; (2) mainte-
nance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the 
judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum’s governmental interests; 
and (5) application of the better rule of law.112 Leflar intended no 
priority among the considerations. Rather, in his view, their relative 
 
 108. See, e.g., Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106 (N.J. 1996) (weighing New Jersey’s 
interests in applying its law against Georgia’s interests in applying its law and holding that New 
Jersey’s interests were weightier). 
 109. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, §§ 93–99 (Leflar’s Choice-Influencing Con-
siderations). 
 110. See Ralph U. Whitten, Improving the “Better Law” System: Some Impudent Sug-
gestions for Reordering and Reformulating Leflar’s Choice-Influencing Considerations, 52 
ARK. L. REV. 177, 181 (1999). 
 111. See id. at 182 n.11 and accompanying text. At least five states use Leflar’s system in 
at least certain types of cases. See id. at 179. 
 112. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282 (1966); see also MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, §§ 93–99. 
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importance varies according to the kind of case involved.113 Thus, the 
first consideration, predictability of results, is unimportant in un-
planned situations, such as those represented in tort cases, but is very 
important in cases involving planned transactions, such as con-
tracts.114 Essentially, this consideration involves selection of the ap-
plicable substantive law that will, if possible, allow parties to know at 
the time of a consensual transaction what law will be applied to the 
transaction.115 
The maintenance of interstate order consideration is directed at 
assuring appropriate deference to another state’s law when the other 
state has a substantial interest in having its law applied, even when 
the forum also has an interest.116 Thus, this consideration exhorts the 
forum’s courts not to engage in raw preference for forum law regard-
less of the interests of other states. Simplification of the judicial task 
most often applies when the forum is asked to apply the procedural 
law of another state. It weighs most heavily when the forum is asked 
to import substantial parts of the procedural machinery of another 
state when resolving a controversy under the other state’s law. It 
weighs less heavily when simpler “outcome determinative” proce-
dural rules of the other state are at issue.117 Advancement of the fo-
rum’s governmental interest consideration focuses on whether the 
forum has sufficient contacts with the parties and event to produce 
“real reasons” for applying forum law.118 This consideration may 
seem to be identical to the inquiry conducted under governmental 
interest analysis to determine whether the forum’s law is supported 
by policies that would be furthered if the law were applied to the 
case.119 However, Leflar envisioned a somewhat broader inquiry into 
governmental interests than did Professor Currie. Leflar stated that 
we should think of governmental interests in terms of the “total gov-
ernmental concerns of a justice-dispensing court in a modern Ameri-
can state.”120 This broadened inquiry was clearly designed to expand 
the examination of the forum’s interests beyond the policies support-
 
 113. See Leflar, supra note 112, at 282. 
 114. See id. at 300–01. 
 115. See id. at 283. 
 116. See id. at 286–87. 
 117. Id. at 288–89. 
 118. Id. at 290–95. 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 97–102. 
 120. See Leflar, supra note 112, at 295. 
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ing the specific forum law at issue in the case and into more ethereal 
matters.121 
The “better law” consideration is the most controversial of those 
articulated by Leflar. Leflar believed that this consideration was one 
that courts had always employed, often covertly.122 His point was 
that it was proper for courts to select between conflicting laws on the 
basis of their quality in order to achieve justice in the individual 
case.123 The consideration invites courts to determine whether forum 
law is “anachronistic, behind the times, a ‘drag on the coat tails of 
civilization,’ or that the law of some other state has these benighted 
characteristics.”124 
Marriage was one of the areas in which Leflar believed that pre-
dictability of results pointed strongly in favor of selecting the law fa-
voring validity.125 Maintenance of interstate order also militated in 
favor of sustaining the validity of a marriage invalid in the forum but 
valid where performed, because “[i]t is messy to have a couple mar-
ried in one state and not in another, or to be uncertain what law de-
termines if they are married or unmarried.”126 However, Leflar 
seemed to agree that the forum’s policies could trump non-forum 
law when forum domiciliaries were involved and thus render invalid a 
marriage that was valid where performed.127 He hedged quite a bit 
on this, however, indicating that the strength of the forum’s invali-
dating policies can vary quite a bit from one fact situation to an-
other,128 which accords with the prior observation, above, concern-
ing the variation in the strength with which the strong public policy 
exception applies from case to case.129 As for the better law consid-
eration, Leflar observed, in the context of a hypothetical extra-state 
marriage invalid under forum law because one of the parties was un-
derage, that it could be assumed that the forum would “prefer its 
own law unless it is anachronistic, as it clearly is not in the present 
 
 121. See id.; see also Whitten, supra note 110, at 201–05 (criticizing this approach to 
determining the forum’s interests). 
 122. See Leflar, supra note 112, at 295–304; see also Whitten, supra note 110, at 227. 
 123. See Leflar, supra note 112, at 297, 303–04; Whitten, supra note 110, at 227. 
 124. See Leflar, supra note 112, at 299–300. 
 125. See id. at 283–84, 321. 
 126. See id. at 321. 
 127. See id. at 321–22 (discussing the marriage of two forum domiciliaries, one under-
age, in another state under whose law the marriage would be valid). 
 128. See id. at 322. 
 129. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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case, but the importance of this preference is relatively small as 
against the genuine significance of [the other choice-influencing 
considerations].”130 Thus, whether the advancement of the forum’s 
governmental interests would trump predictability and maintenance 
of interstate order would depend partly on the seriousness with 
which the forum viewed its invalidating policy and partly on what 
was being litigated in the action. Thus, he suggested that the under-
age marriage would be invalidated under forum law in a suit for an 
annulment, but validated under non-forum law if one of the spouses 
is claiming a survivor’s share in the other spouse’s estate.131 
How would Leflar’s choice-influencing considerations apply to 
domestic partnership cases? Assume again that A and B are domi-
ciliaries of State X, which recognizes domestic partnerships, and that 
they live in State X long enough and under sufficient circumstances 
that they would be considered domestic partners under principles 
identical to those proposed by the ALI. They move to State Y, which 
does not recognize domestic partnerships and there decide to end 
their relationship. A sues B in a State Y court to obtain recognition 
of the domestic partnership under State X law and obtain a property 
award from A. The predictability of results consideration is arguably 
less important in the domestic partnership situation described above 
than it is in a case involving the validity of a marriage. Although A 
and B entered into a consensual relationship in State X, they did not 
plan the relationship in the same manner as a couple that chooses to 
marry. Nor did they enter into a contract in which they attempted to 
settle the financial rights and obligations arising from their relation-
ship, as they might have done. Indeed, it is difficult to say that any 
real expectations would be defeated if a State Y court applied its own 
law and refused to recognize the relationship. Similarly, the mainte-
nance of interstate order consideration is also arguably weaker in the 
domestic partnership case described than it is in cases of marriage. If 
there is uncertainty about what the parties’ financial rights and obli-
gations will be, including uncertainty created by doubt about the law 
that will be applied, it is uncertainty created by the parties’ failure to 
marry or contract. The criteria for recognizing domestic partnerships 
 
 130. See Leflar, supra note 112, at 322. In the context of the underage marriage, Leflar 
also considered the simplification of the judicial task consideration to be unimportant. See id. 
at 321. 
 131. See id. at 322. 
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are themselves fluid.132 Therefore, even if the parties had remained in 
State X, it might not be completely clear whether their domestic 
partnership would be recognized. Furthermore, to the extent that 
the maintenance of interstate order consideration exhorts states to 
take into account the interests of other states, the same problem ex-
ists as discussed earlier with interest analysis: does the change in 
domicile from State X to State Y weaken or destroy State X’s interest 
in applying its law to A and B?133 Although Leflar’s system does not 
emphasize domiciliary connections as much as interest analysis,134 
domicile still matters in his system and creates the same kind of un-
certainty that it creates in governmental interest analysis. 
The simplification of the judicial task factor might also present 
problems for domestic partnerships under Leflar’s system. The ALI 
Principles contain presumptions and other evidentiary factors de-
signed to facilitate a court’s determination of the existence of a do-
mestic partnership.135 Because the simplification of the judicial task 
factor is designed primarily to avoid substantial importation of the 
procedural law of another state into adjudications within the forum, 
this factor would weigh in favor of State Y not applying the domestic 
partnership law of State X if that law is configured as the ALI rec-
ommends. Furthermore, a strong emphasis by State Y on the simpli-
fication of the judicial task factor might cause it to reject application 
of the domestic partnership law of State X entirely, given that the 
“procedural” portions of the ALI Principles are inextricably inter-
 
 132. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(7) (stating that 
whether persons have shared a life together as a couple is determined by all the circumstances 
and listing thirteen considerations that can, among others, be taken into account in making the 
determination). 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 103–04. 
 134. See Leflar, supra note 112, at 293: 
The once powerful concern of the domiciliary state with matters of familial status is 
weakening. In the United States, the increasing mobility of the citizenry is decreas-
ing the importance attached to the socio-political idea of each person’s having a pre-
eminent headquarters at some one place. The fact that in this country the states are 
becoming more alike, less chauvinistic in their eccentricities, contributes to this. 
Most of the states are becoming accustomed to the fact that a large proportion of 
the human beings who at any given moment are working or playing within their 
borders will have ties with other states as well. An effect of this is that the states are 
less concerned than they once were with protection of the local citizen as distin-
guished from the “stranger,” and more inclined than they once were to promulgate 
and enforce laws that apply to both equally . . . . 
 135. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(3), (6), (7). See also 
supra note 84. 
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twined with the substantive portions. Even if State Y only rejected 
the procedural part of State X’s partnership law, however, the partial 
rejection might create significant difficulties for the plaintiff in estab-
lishing the existence of the partnership. If State Y substitutes eviden-
tiary provisions of its own for the ones found in the ALI Principles, 
and if the provisions favor the defendant more than do those of the 
ALI Principles, the result on the outcome of the action could be sig-
nificant. 
Another real question in the domestic partnership case described 
would be whether the forum considers that it has a strong interest in 
refusing to recognize domestic partnerships. Again, this presents the 
same problems of policy identification discussed above in conjunc-
tion with governmental interest analysis,136 plus the additional need 
to estimate how strong State Y’s interest is in comparison with that 
of State X. Both aspects of the inquiry create additional uncertainty 
about how State Y as the forum will react to the choice-of-law prob-
lem. Finally, of course, the better law consideration in Leflar’s system 
is an additional wild card that creates unpredictability. It is conceiv-
able that even if State Y determines that the weight of all of the other 
choice-influencing considerations is low and that the interests of 
both involved states are relatively weak, the court might still deter-
mine that its own law is a “drag on the coat tails of civilization” and 
apply State X’s domestic partnership law as the “better law.” Doubt-
less the court’s tendency to do this would depend upon its conserva-
tive or activist tendencies. 
5. Summary 
The above discussion has attempted to identify the points of dif-
ficulty that will exist in conflicts cases involving domestic partner-
ships under the principal choice-of-law systems in use today in the 
United States. The analysis has been far from exhaustive, but may be 
useful in identifying the chief questions that will arise as states begin 
to adopt domestic partnership laws. The absence of real-world ex-
perience with domestic partnerships, coupled with the differences be-
tween those partnerships and the analogy that courts are most likely 
to look to in determining conflicts cases—marriage—creates substan-
tial doubt about how conflicts problems with domestic partnerships 
 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
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will be resolved under the principal choice-of-law systems. Each of 
those systems has points at which uncertainty of application exists, 
even in conflicts situations with which the courts have had a signifi-
cant amount of experience. This uncertainty will exist in domestic 
partnership situations as well. In addition, the novel character of 
domestic partnerships will create additional uncertainty. Only con-
crete cases will resolve that uncertainty, if indeed it can be resolved at 
all. 
C. Same-Sex Domestic Partnerships 
All of the same conflicts problems that exist with domestic part-
nerships between persons of the opposite sex will also exist with 
same-sex partnerships. In addition, same-sex domestic partners can 
expect greater difficulty in obtaining recognition of partnerships 
formed in states where they are valid when the partners migrate to 
other states. This is because of the existence of statutory or constitu-
tional provisions prohibiting same-sex marriages and substitutes for 
marriage in many states. This legislation will sometimes, though 
rarely, control a choice-of-law decision directly. More often, it will 
provide a potential basis for determining that a state has a public pol-
icy against formal recognition of same-sex marriages, and the public 
policy may be extended by analogy to the domestic partnership area. 
An example of a situation in which a state’s law will directly con-
trol a choice-of-law decision concerning domestic partnerships is a 
recent constitutional provision adopted by referendum in Nebraska. 
Article I, Section 29, of the Nebraska Constitution now provides, 
“Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recog-
nized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a 
civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relation-
ship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.”137  
The prohibition in this provision against recognition of domestic 
partnerships would preclude a Nebraska court from making a choice-
of-law decision that applies the domestic partnership law of another 
state to same-sex partners who have moved to Nebraska. However, 
Nebraska is currently unique in having a provision directly dealing 
with domestic partnerships. Thirty-five states138 now have “defense of 
 
 137. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (adopted 2000). 
 138. See David O. Coolidge & William C. Duncan, The Nebraska Marriage Amendment: 
It’s All About Marriage 7 n.10 (October 6, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
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marriage” statutes or constitutional provisions, but Nebraska’s, as 
one of the two newest, is the only one that deals with domestic part-
nerships. This is because domestic partnerships themselves are a rela-
tively new concept, having been approved by the ALI only in May of 
2000.139 More typical are provisions that simply provide that mar-
riage is limited to persons of opposite sexes. For example, Utah sim-
ply provides that marriages between persons of the same sex are pro-
hibited.140 Such provisions would not directly control the choice-of-
law decision as does the Nebraska constitutional amendment, but 
they could have an indirect impact on that decision. 
Both the Restatement and Restatement (Second) provisions re-
sort to the public policy concept at some point in determining the 
validity of marriages. To the extent that the marriage analogy con-
trols domestic partnership cases, public policy might also be brought 
to bear on choice-of-law decisions in the latter cases. It is conceivable 
that courts applying the public policy concept might draw on the 
policies against same-sex marriage to invalidate same-sex partner-
ships, even if they would sustain domestic partnerships between per-
sons of the opposite sex. Furthermore, under both governmental in-
terest analysis and Leflar’s choice-influencing considerations, it is 
necessary to identify policies supporting the forum’s law and those of 
other states in order to apply the systems. Courts have, to put it 
mildly, not been shy about finding state policies and interests in 
some problematic ways.141 Under both systems it would not be sur-
prising to find courts resorting to prohibitions on same-sex marriage 
as defining the policy of forum law for same-sex domestic partner-
ships. 
The point is not that the analogy to same-sex marriage will nec-
essarily defeat claims based on same-sex partnerships authorized un-
der the laws of other states, but that it might do so. Thus, there will 
likely be greater general difficulty in obtaining recognition of same-
 
Creighton Law School Library) (discussing the Nebraska provision when it was still an initia-
tive measure). At the cited page, the document lists thirty-three states that have adopted provi-
sions limiting marriage to a man and a woman. To these must be added Nebraska and Nevada, 
which passed provisions in November 2000. 
 139. See id. at 11 (discussing why domestic partnerships and civil unions were included in 
the Nebraska provision). 
 140. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(5) (Supp. 2000). 
 141. For example, the California Court of Appeals once identified the policy supporting a 
Mexican limit on the amount of damages that could be recovered for wrongful death as the 
encouragement of tourism! See Hernandez v. Burger, 162 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Ct. App. 1980). 
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sex partnerships in other states than there will be in obtaining such 
recognition for opposite-sex domestic partnerships. In addition, if 
other states follow Nebraska’s lead, their statutes and constitutional 
provisions dealing with same-sex marriages may also be extended to 
domestic partnerships in the future, thus producing direct control 
over the choice-of-law decision under the internal law of many fo-
rums. 
IV. CONCLUSION: FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT? 
“The life of the law,” wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes, “has not 
been logic: it has been experience.”142 The reader will understand by 
now the main difficulty with this article: there is no experience to 
draw on in analyzing the conflict-of-laws problems that will occur in 
domestic partnership cases. Logic, with all of its deficiencies, must 
do. But logic leaves us with an unsettled picture indeed. 
With regard to domestic partnerships between persons of the 
opposite sex, enforcement of judgments will be straightforward 
enough under existing law. At the very least, the jurisdictional and 
other problems with such judgments will be no more difficult than 
with any other kind of judgment arising from the domestic relations 
area. As the preceding discussion has indicated, however, there is 
great uncertainty about how choice-of-law decisions will be made in 
cases involving both opposite-sex and same-sex domestic partner-
ships. The uncertainty is produced both by our lack of experience 
generally with domestic partnerships and by the fact that the mar-
riage analogy the courts are most likely to draw on in analyzing con-
flicts problems in the domestic partnership area is not completely apt 
for the job. The real question is whether there is available a mecha-
nism with which to curtail, if not altogether eliminate, choice-of-law 
uncertainty. 
One possibility, for both opposite-sex and same-sex partners, is 
contract. The ALI envisions that contracts between domestic part-
ners can waive or limit claims otherwise provided for under its do-
mestic partnership principles, as well as provide remedies not pro-
vided for under the principles.143 In addition, the ALI Principles 
provide explicitly that they do not foreclose contract claims between 
persons who have no claims under the principles, “but who have 
 
 142. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Harvard 1967). 
 143. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01(2). 
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formed a contract that is enforceable under applicable law.”144 In 
conflict of laws generally, there is a strong tendency to enforce con-
tracts with multi-state elements or characteristics, as long as they 
have substantial connections with any state under whose law they are 
valid.145 In addition, choice-of-law clauses in contracts, whereby par-
ties select the law of the state to govern their contractual rights and 
duties, are usually enforced, as long as there is a reasonable basis for 
the choice.146 Furthermore, the parties may be able to create even 
greater certainty by inserting a choice-of-forum clause in a contract, 
by which the parties agree to litigate any issues arising out of their 
agreement in a particular state. By this method, they may select the 
courts of a state that is friendly to their contractual arrangement. 
Reasonable choice-of-forum clauses, like choice-of-law clauses, are 
also usually enforced in the United States.147 Thus, a contract be-
tween opposite-sex or same-sex148 partners can greatly reduce the 
uncertainty existing in the choice-of-law context. 
It is, of course, obvious that contracts between domestic partners 
may not be practical, for the same reason that prenuptial agreements 
are often not practical. The nature of the relationships involved is 
such that it may not occur to the partners to provide a contractual 
financial settlement that will be relevant only if their relationship 
terminates. In matters of the heart, the relationship may be pre-
sumed, alas frequently in error, to be eternal. Even if it occurs to one 
of the partners that a contractual arrangement might be prudent, it 
may not be possible to persuade the other partner, perhaps the fi-
nancially more secure of the two, that it is in his or her best interest 
to enter into such an agreement. 
Thus, while contractual arrangements hold the possibility of 
eliminating much of the uncertainty that exists in the choice-of-law 
area, the impracticality of such contracts may leave the uncertainty 
 
 144. Id. § 6.01(3). 
 145. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 135 (Contracts: The Preference for Vali-
dation). 
 146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (Supp. 1989); see also 
MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 136 (Contracts with a Choice-of-law Clause). 
 147. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 48 (Choice-of-Forum Clauses); TEPLY & 
WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 352–54. 
 148. It should be noted that even provisions such as those of Nebraska, described in the 
preceding section, are not designed to affect private contracts. They are only designed to pro-
hibit same-sex relationships from producing rights by operation of law. See supra text accom-
panying note 137. 
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intact. If this is so, domestic partners will be left with choice-of-law 
doctrine by default. This is not a happy situation, but it will likely be 
no unhappier with regard to domestic partnerships than it is in many 
other areas. American choice-of-law doctrine has been aptly de-
scribed as a “mess.”149 There is no reason to expect domestic part-
nerships, whether a good or a bad idea generally, to make the mess 
any better or any worse. 
 
 
 149. See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2449 (1999). Objecting to a proposal for a third conflicts restatement, 
the late Professor Friedrich Juenger queried, “How does one restate gibberish?” Friedrich K. 
Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 403 (2000). 
